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The objective of this thesis is to analyze the WTO’s Doha Round, its numerous 
objectives, assess the major issues that led to its stagnation, as well as examine the economic 
prospects for developing nations and the potential future of international trade and development. 
The globalization of free trade capitalism has become an incredibly permeating and constantly 
evolving series of socio-economic processes that fundamentally reshaped today’s global 
landscape. Arguably one of the greatest facilitators of economic globalization is the World Trade 
Organization, which has become an instrumental authority on the world economy. Since its 
creation in 1995, the WTO has emerged as one of the foremost advocates of free-trade and 
economic liberalization. Currently consisting of 160 member countries, the WTO’s negotiations 
and subsequent rulings have dramatically altered the manner in which countries conduct trade 
and, according to a number of its supporters, has come to embody the very ideals of globalization 
through international cooperation and economic cohesion. However, within the last several 
years, the WTO has faced tremendous criticism, particularly concerning the ineptitude and 
failure of its latest negotiation round, the Doha Development Agenda. Originally commencing in 
2001 in Doha, Qatar, the Round sought to address numerous issues regarding global trade, 
including concerns over agricultural and industrial tariffs, the removal of trade subsidies, the 
economic welfare of lesser developed countries, and continued decrease in protectionist 
economic trade policies. Now more than fourteen years later, the Doha Round remains 
unresolved, with numerous political factions being formed between developed and developing 
countries over the intended goals and direction of the agenda, and painting a grim view of the 
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Globalization and the WTO 
 Globalization is a unique and complex process that has fundamentally reshaped the 
manner in which modern nations interact today, and has largely been driven through the 
expansion of international trade, foreign direct investment and technological innovation 
(Deardorff and Stern 2002). Although not entirely a new phenomenon, the globalization of 
capitalism and the flow of trade and production have rapidly transformed the global landscape 
over the last half century, and has been heavily fostered by growing influences of multinational 
corporations as well as the establishment of international systems such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and more recently the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Deardorff and Stern 2002). On a more critical level, globalization can be defined as an 
expansion of capitalist and neoliberalist ideals onto a global scale and a fundamental shift away 
from autonomous nation-states and local governance towards a competitive international market 
structure, a system that emphasizes openness and leading to the removal of restrictive economic 
policies and subsequently, the reduction of national economic control  (Kellner 2002).  
 Today, international trade is larger than it has ever been, and has become a multi-trillion 
dollar industry, with an estimated total export value of more than $17 trillion as of 2013, 
accounting for nearly 30 percent of the world’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(International Trade Statistics  2014; World Development Indicators  2014). This massive 
transformation towards global integration and economic uniformity has not been without 




increased competition between participating countries and in many instances has led to the 
marginalization of smaller economies, particularly ones belonging to countries in the developing 
world. Often these countries are pushed to the periphery in favor of larger economic powers of 












The role of the WTO in the spread of free-trade liberalization is both enormous and 
complex. As the only international organization specifically concerned with the regulation of 
international trade, the WTO exerts enormous political influence, facilitating as a forum for trade 
negotiations between member countries, as well as ensuring that countries abide by the rules of 
trade that are agreed upon through its various negotiation rounds (Solanki 2012). Since its formal 
establishment in 1995, the organization’s principle mandates have been to ensure trade without 
discrimination, to ensure freer trade via negotiation rounds and the gradual removals of trade 
barriers, to allow for greater transparency and predictability of trade, to promote fair competition 
Figure 1: World Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) 
 
Source:  The World Bank, 2014 






as well as encourage economic development and reform (What is the WTO?  2015; Solanki 
2012)  
Figure 2: The World Trade Organization 
 
Source: WTO, 2015  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  
 
Currently, the WTO membership governs 97 percent of international trade, and consists 
of 161 member countries, representing more than 80 percent of the world’s governments (WTO, 
2015). Yet despite its enormous clout and its stated goals to promote both freer and fairer trade, 
the WTO has also been the subject of intense scrutiny and suspicion, and has been heavily 
criticized by both developed and developing nations alike. Much of this criticism stems from a 
growing backlash against globalization itself and the proliferation of free trade under the WTO 




growth, it is now being seen by many opponents to be counterproductive or even harmful to 
economies and businesses who lack the means of realistically competing on the global scale, and 
has been blamed for the widening political and economic disparities between developed and 
developing nations (Griller 2008; Solanki 2012). 
To address these issues, the WTO launched a new round of negotiations, the 4th 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar on November 2001, dubbed the Doha Development 
Agenda. This new round of negotiations was held to specifically address the growing concerns of 
free-trade capitalism and attend to the many grievances of its developing member countries over 
their adoption of free trade. Originally expected to be concluded by 2005, the round is now in its 
fourteenth year, and in that time has not only further polarized the WTO’s membership, but it has 
also cast doubts on the organization’s legitimacy as an effective mediator (Griller 2008; Scott 
and Wilkinson 2011). So what went wrong? Why has the Doha Round fail to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion and what are the major obstacles that have divided the WTO’s membership? To 
properly answer these questions requires a throughout understanding of both Doha and the WTO 
as a whole, as well as an understanding of the important political structures and historical factors 
behind international trade and globalization.  
 
Methodology and Organization 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate the important technical and social dimensions 
concerning the relationship between globalization, trade and development. Therefore a number 
of primary and secondary sources have been consulted, including financial data from various 




of international trade and its evolution over the last six decades are also fundamental aspects to 
the aims of this thesis. To this end, historical analysis was used to examine the important 
interactions of global trade and the crucial participating countries, with important trade 
discussions and WTO ministerial conferences being highlighted for their significance in shaping 
or in many cases hampering global trade and development. Tables and graphs were composed 
and taken from various organizations which include the IMF, World Bank and the WTO in order 
to illustrate important geo-economic shifts in the world economy. Case studies were also used to 
denote the most vulnerable participants of global trade and highlight the potential dangers of 
continued trade marginalization. In light of the broad scope of international trade and the 
complexities of economic globalization, this thesis will focus primarily on the WTO and the 
Doha Round. 
The organization of this thesis is arranged in the following chapters. Chapter 1 provides a 
brief introduction of globalization as well as the extent of the WTO. It also outlines the structure 
of the thesis and the important topics that will be addressed. Chapter  2 examines the history of 
both the WTO and its negotiation rounds, concentrating on the key economic and political 
drivers of free trade and the major issues of contention that have arisen in the fourteen years of 
negotiations. It provides important historical context to economic globalization and the 
experiences of participating countries that are critical to understand Doha and the issues of trade 
that have polarized developed and developing countries and the imbalances that have resulted. 
Chapter 3 is devoted specifically to the Doha Round and to the plights of developing nations, 
discussing the institutional and developmental roadblocks they have and will continue to face in 
their economic futures. It articulates the failure of the WTO to reach a proper conclusion and 




negotiations and the fragmentation of the international trade community. Lastly, Chapter 4 
analyzes the institutional and philosophical divisions that surround Doha, as well as examines the 
experiences of poorer developing countries. It offers some speculation on the future of global 
trade as well as details how Doha’s continued delay hinders the health of marginalized nations 
who are in need of important concessions. The chapter also discusses the potential geopolitical 
and economic ramifications if Doha ends in failure or continues to stagnate indefinitely. It also 
explores whether or not Doha has inadvertently or irrevocably fragmented the political and 
economic landscapes of participating member countries, and critiques current views and future 
viewpoints on the Doha Round and the WTO itself.   
This thesis does not presume to be all-encompassing and does not seek to find a 
miraculous solution to the multitude of problems that currently plague international trade and the 
countries who participate in it. Instead, the overall objective of this thesis is to evaluate the Doha 
Round, as well as to critique the important mechanisms of global multilateral trade and their 
effects on poorer developing countries. It provides a geographical and geopolitical approach to 
the issues of trade and development. It also aims to highlight transparent imbalances that have 
resulted from the prevailing multilateral trade system, imbalances that continues to severely limit 
the overall developmental and economic welfare of many countries in the developing world. 
Although focusing heavily on the WTO and its mediation of globalized trade, this thesis does not 
seek to accuse the organization or any particular group, but merely seeks to identify and examine 
the important geo-political and historical events that have led to the uneven outcome of global 
trade. The Doha Ministerial Conference is appropriately the central focus of this critique, as its 
very commencement in 2001 serves as an institutional acknowledgement of the shortcomings of 




allows for a more thorough examination of the WTO itself, and helps to put in perspective the 
incredible importance as well as the major shortfalls of the current multilateral trade system. To 
this end, the past events and future prospects of Doha are all taken into account in order to 
demonstrate the incredible difficulties that the WTO and the international trade community 



















Background and Theoretical Framework  
Before dealing with the current performance of the WTO’s Doha Round, it is important 
to understand the history of international trade in order to fully appreciate how its past continues 
to affect the current trade landscape. The following addresses the various stages of international 
trades as well as the organizations and political mechanisms of global trade governance. 
Although the WTO’s formal establishment took place in 1995, its roots in international trade can 
be traced further back to the turn of the 20th Century and the international institutions that were 
established during the post-war era (VanGrasstek 2013). In the decades prior to World War I, the 
global economic landscape comprised primarily of bilateral trade agreements between European 
countries. Following a Most Favored Nations (MFN) schema, international trade was relatively 
open in spite of a lack of any institutional mechanisms. Despite a lack of multilateral 
cooperation, countries at the time maintained generally low trade barriers and exercised minimal 
trade discrimination, leading to an upsurge in economic prosperity and overall trade volume 
(Irwin 1995). However, the events of World War I brought an end to the bilateral treaty schema 
and brought about an increase in protectionist policies, with the introduction of higher trade 
barriers and discriminatory practices such as foreign exchange controls and import quotas. These 
changes to international trade towards a more regionalized system were unable to be reversed 
despite attempts at reform from the League of Nations and the World Economic Conference 
(Irwin 1995). The Great Depression of the 1930s was another tremendous blow to the health of 
the world economy, and brought about a disastrous decade concerning trade with even greater 
protectionist policies and trade barriers being implemented. Many free trade theorists have 




result of these economic disasters, a concerted effort was made by the prevailing economic 
powers following World War II and the Reconstruction era to create a robust international 
system that would reduce trade barriers and gradually remove tariffs (Irwin 1995). 
 
The GATT 
Near the end of World War II, and led by the United States, a number of new economic 
and political systems were put into place, the most two notable being the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Steger 2009; VanGrasstek 
2013). However, a third crucial element of international governance, the International Trade 
Agreement (ITO) was never formally ratified. This crucial piece ultimately fell victim to political 
climate of the Cold War, and strong opposition against a global trading system that could 
potentially undermine the economic sovereignty of participatory nation-states (VanGrasstek 
2013). Ironically, it was the United States that proved the ITO’s final downfall, with Congress 
failing to ratify the Havana Charter, which would have drafted the organization into existence 
(VanGrasstek 2013). In response to the failure of the ITO, another organization was formed in its 
place to work towards economic growth and financial stability, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a simplified and supposedly temporary arrangement that would 
ultimately serve as the umbrella for international trade for next half century (Steger 2009; 
VanGrasstek 2013). Formally established in Geneva in 1947, The GATT system’s primary 
function was to reduce industrial trade tariffs, as well as promote multilateral agreements 




“raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of 
the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods”.  
       - (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  1947) 
Under this free trade doctrine to promote financial stability and predictability, the GATT system 
began auspiciously, with twenty three countries ratifying it only two years after the War in 
Europe came to an end. The GATT”s inaugural negotiation round in Geneva included every 
major European country, collectively comprising more than 80 percent of world trade, and 
culminated in a large reduction of import tariffs, with the US alone reducing tariffs by 35% 
(Irwin 1995).  
The GATT’s initial success was soon followed by a dubious fifteen year period that saw 
inconsistent economic growth and only marginable decreases in tariffs. During the 1950s, the 
GATT mainly tried to maintain the progress that was made at its onset, ensuring that members 
renew their pledges to keep trade tariffs low. Cold War politics also prove to be a major 
impediment for the free trade agenda, with the US withholding trade concessions and 
discriminating against satellite Soviet nations (Dunkley 2000). Moreover, the removal of trade 
tariffs gave way to an increase in non-tariff protectionist policies, measures that were allowed by 
the GATT under its emergency safeguard provisions (Dunkley 2000). The United States, Canada 
and Australia were notable countries who took advantage of these provisions, implementing 
protectionist practices such as quotas, subsidies, and interest rate concessions on behalf of their 
export and domestic industries, establishing an uneven economic playing field for the 
competition (Dunkley 2000). The late 1950s and 60s proved to be a little more productive for the 
GATT, coinciding with the creation of the European Union  (EU) in 1957, and a reinvigorated 




Round in 1967 proved to be the most successful negotiations of the post-war era in terms of 
overall decreases in trade tariffs. Reductions in tariffs and other major impediments to 
multilateral trade continued in the Tokyo Round of the 1970s, with the inclusion of Japan after 
pressure from the US and EU over Japan’s tightly controlled economy (Irwin 1995). However, 
that period was littered with political squabbling among the GATT’s membership.  
The early to mid-1980s was a difficult transitional period for the GATT, largely from the 
increasingly aggressive tactics of the United States against any country that was perceived to 
limited access to US exports, in some cases resulting in retaliatory sanctions. Notable disputes 
included the conflict between the US and EU over the banning of US meat with growth 
hormones, and US sanctions against Brazil over its lax standards for intellectual property rights 
(Dunkley 2000). Many had attributed these trade conflicts and continued breaches of multilateral 
trade to be a systemic weakness of the GATT itself and its narrow-minded objectives. Another 
major issue of contention came from the GATT’s safeguards provisions outlined under Article 
XVIII, which stated: 
“The contracting parties recognize further that it may be necessary for those 
contracting parties, in order to implement programmes and policies of economic 
development designed to raise the general standard of living of their people, to 
take protective or other measures affecting imports, and that such measures are 
justified in so far as they facilitate the attainment of the objectives of this 
Agreement.”                
         –( GATT Article XVIII:      
       Governmental Assistance to Economic Development) 
This provision was loosely outlined and frequently abused, leading to an overall decrease in 
tariffs, but an increase in non-tariff protections. The United States in particular played a dualist 
role as both a champion for, as well as an opponent of liberalized trade, targeting other countries 




maintaining a number of protectionist policies in support of its own exports (Dunkley 2000). 
Other areas of trade such as agriculture and textiles fell out of the GATT’s authority and left 
many non-industrialized nations with little reason to play an active role in GATT negotiations. 
The GATT dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms were also seen as sorely lacking and 
costly, and critics saw the system as overly discriminatory process that invariably favored 
wealthier developed countries (DeKieffer 1980; Dunkley 2000). These major shortfalls would be 
addressed in what would be the GATT’s final negotiation round, the Uruguay Round.  
 
The Uruguay Round 
The apparent weaknesses of the GATT system and the only partial inclusion of 
developing countries into its agendas were the primary motivations for the commencement of the 
8th Ministerial Meeting at Punta del Este in 1986 (Dunkley 2000; Finger 2001). The main 
objectives of this particular round were the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade as well as the 
expansion of the GATT agreement to encompass other areas of trade including agriculture and 
textiles. These inclusions to the GATT, which had largely been ignored during previous rounds, 
were expected to increase the level of participation from developing countries who had remained 
largely passive in previous negotiations (Finger 2001). Prior to 1986, developing countries that 
were involved in negotiations mostly sought to free themselves from GATT rules and 
requirements to lower trade barriers, often times lacking the resources or technical expertise for 
favorable trade policy-making. Moreover, GATT regulations were predominantly inapplicable to 
the needs and desires of the developing world, as agriculture and textiles, areas of the economy 




under the umbrella of GATT multilateralism (Ostry 2002). In past rounds, certain agricultural 
goods like soy and wheat did appear as individual commodities and were subject to tariff 
restrictions, but agriculture as a whole was largely exempt from mandatory removal of import 
restrictions or subsidization. As such, GATT largely ignored the developing world until 
Uruguay, with many of their principle exports in food and clothing being exempt from trade 
barrier restrictions. 
The Uruguay Round was expected to be the most comprehensive and largest in GATT’s 
50 year period, and would specifically address the weaknesses of the GATT system, 
incorporating new areas of trade that had previously been exempt, notably agriculture, textiles, 
trade in services, and intellectual property rights (Khan and Kazmi 1994; Ostry 2002). Totaling 
117 contracting parties, the commencement of the Uruguay Round in 1986 in many ways 
reflected a crucial shift in current beliefs of international trade and its significance to 
development, as it was the first negotiation under the GATT system in which developing 
countries played a much larger and active role (Finger 2001; Ostry 2002). It was also heavily 
aided by a convergence of major political and economic factors on the world scene, including an 
increase in GATT membership of developing countries. Overall shares of global trade among 
developing countries rose from 21% in 1973 to 26% in 1986, and by the mid-1980s, GATT’s 
membership consisted predominantly of developing countries, with 37 new members added in 
1987 (Ostry 2002). Many of these nations were undergoing a difficult transitional period in their 
economies at this time as a result of the Debt Crisis of the 1980s and the structural adjustment 
programs imposed on them by the IMF and World Bank (Ostry 2002). This coincided with a 
dramatic decrease in the global value of agricultural exports (Sandiford 1994). As a result, 




economic development, seeking greater access to developed markets (Finger 2001; Ostry 2002). 
This combined with the fall of Berlin Wall only three years later brought about a vindication of 
the free trade system, as well as a general increase in the desire for economic inclusion, 
diversification and reform (Ostry 2002; Tussie and Lengyel 2001).  
Despite this extraordinary convergence of circumstances and more fervent efforts on part 
of developing member countries, Uruguay’s discussions were still rife with painstakingly slow 
negotiations and growing political friction between developed and developing countries over a 
number of critical issues. Much of this was because of Uruguay’s incredibly broad and ambitious 
agenda, which not only included agriculture, and continued reduction in tariffs for industrial 
goods, but also sought the ‘tariffication’ of non-tariff barriers, long-term commitments for 
reduced protections, eliminations of voluntary export restraints, institutional changes and reforms 
for anti-dumping and countervailing measures, as well as the inclusion of new aspects of trade 
like trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) and Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) (Kumar 2002). The largest and most contentious of these was the 
debate over agriculture, particularly agricultural subsidies, leading to a highly divisive split of 
GATT membership into various collations. Agricultural discussions were dominated by the 
United States, the European Union and the Australian-led CAIRNS group, a coalition consisting 
of 13 developed and developing nations (Hamilton and Whalley 1989; Ostry 2002; Tussie and 
Lengyel 2001). This collation of both upper and lower income countries from both Latin 
American and Asiatic regions was formed as a result of continued stalling from the EU over its 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Ostry 2002). At the same time, the US and EU were having 
their own disputes over the highly protected dairy sector, and the subsidization of farm goods 




conference in Montreal. At the conference, both US and EU negotiators declared that there was 
no agreement on agriculture, but all other issues agreed at the meeting could proceed. CAIRNS 
Group representatives responded by rejecting all other agreements until an agreement for 
agriculture was made to their satisfaction (Ostry 2002).  
Agriculture was not the only significant obstacle that impeded progress in Uruguay talks. 
Other major topics of contention on the agenda included the regulation of trade in services and 
the issue of intellectual property rights. These areas of trade were not only new to the 
international agenda, but were also new to developing countries from an implemental standpoint. 
Developed countries, notably the United States, saw new opportunities for commercial and 
financial access into new markets, and insisted on the adoption of an internationally recognized 
standard for intellectual property rights (Finger and Nogues 2001). These measures were highly 
beneficial for developed countries’ multinational corporations and private sectors, particularly 
for US pharmaceutical companies, while developing countries were wary of the procedural and 
implementation costs of these new agreements, and had great concern over the potential effects 
that intellectual property rights would have on the transfer of technologies (Hossain and Lasker 
2010; Khan and Kazmi 1994). Trade in services was also a new and tenuous addition, as 
developed countries’ pressured for the liberalization of services on behalf of their private sectors. 
This was due to the increasing importance of these sectors to the global economy and its 
potential benefits of foreign direct investment (Chanda 2002). Developing countries were largely 
unfamiliar with these ‘new’ aspects of trade, which proved to be difficult impediments and were 
met with resistance from the so-called G10 Hardliners, led by Brazil and India, who sternly 
opposed the inclusion of these issues into the negotiations. Thus, Uruguay trade discussions 




trying to push agriculture onto the agenda while simultaneously trying to avoid making major 
commitments to these newly risen aspects of trade (Finger 2001; Finger and Nogues 2001; Ostry 
2002).     
 
The Grand Bargain and the Birth of the WTO: 
Despite serious drawbacks and continued delays, the long and overdue conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round culminated in two major milestones for international trade. The first was what 
Sylvia Ostry called the ‘grand bargain’, an exchange of concessions between the developed 
countries of the Global North and developing countries of the Global South (Ostry 2002). 
Following the standoffs at the 1988 Conference in Montreal and Brussels in 1990, an accord was 
finally reached between participating developed and developing countries in 1993. The US and 
EU also reached an accord on agriculture through the informal Blair House accord, and the G10 
Hardliners eventually relinquished their stance on the exclusions of non-merchandise trade in 
services, agreeing to adopt domestic regulations in exchange for improved market access and 
reduced barriers in textiles and agriculture (Chanda 2002; Finger 2001; Ostry 2002). This 
exchange sought to reach a compromise between opposing groups. Developed countries would 
gradually open their markets and liberalize trade barriers for items like agricultural goods and 
textiles over a period of ten years, in exchange for developing countries agreeing to make 
commitments on areas like trade in services, investment and intellectual property standards 
(Finger and Nogues 2001; Ostry 2002). 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round resulted in a number of new agreements and 




agriculture, in which signatory parties agreed to reduce subsidized exports by 36 percent over a 
period of six years, as well as reduce the overall quantity of subsidized agricultural goods by 21 
percent (Sandiford 1994). Concerning tariff cuts, Uruguay resulted in a dramatic decrease in 
trade tariffs of industrialized goods, with an additional 40% cut for industrial products. 
Developing countries increased their bindings for new and more comprehensive reforms and 
non-tariff barriers to imports were systematically converted into tariffs, while numerous bilateral 
agreements like country-specific quotas were to be gradually phased out over a period of ten 
years (Kumar 2002). New safeguard provisions were established to remedy anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties. The trade dispute system also saw a number of new changes regarding its 
procedures. Prior to Uruguay, GATT’s dispute system was plagued by severely deficient and 
unstructured set of procedures. Dispute settlements had no fixed timetables, often dragged on for 
months without conclusive rulings, and rulings that were made could be blocked by losing 
parties without any serious consequence. The old GATT provision required any ruling to be 
agreed upon by consensus, whereas in the new system, disputes were accorded a certain length 
of time, through clearly defined stages, and any dispute ruling would be automatically adopted 
unless there was a consensus against the ruling (Kumar 2002).   
Undoubtedly the most significant outcome of the Uruguay Round was the formal 
establishment of a successor organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), in January 
1995, a provision which referred back to the original goals of the Havana Charter and the spirit 
of the ITO during the post-war period (Khan and Kazmi 1994). Created under the Marrakesh 
agreement, and unlike its predecessor, the WTO was formed as a permanent organization in 
which all power is allocated to and delegated by its contracting parties, and operates under a 




regarding the rules of trade as well as the rights and responsibilities of its member countries 
(Kumar 2002; Sandiford 1994). The WTO also established a new requirement to convene 
Ministerial Conferences at least once every two years (Kumar 2002). 
The Uruguay Round was a crucial component to the expansion and continued 
propagation of free trade, not only reinforcing or reconfiguring past trade agreements, but also its 
inclusion of new areas of trade that heavily reflected the changing dynamics of the economic 
landscape of the late 20th century. Developing countries for the first time took on a more active 
role in trade discussions. New additions like trade in services and agriculture were heavily 
debated, and despite prolonged political stalemates and numerous missed deadlines, Uruguay 
officially concluded almost eight years after its initial commencement. The older provisional 
GATT system finally underwent a much needed transformation, and the WTO system greatly 
improved upon its largely outmoded predecessor, no longer exclusively focusing on developed 
economies, but also developing economies as well. As a result of continued liberalization and 
reduced distortions in various areas, international trade saw a significant increase during the 
1990s, equating to about 6.3 annual percent growth in the volume of merchandise exports 
(Kumar 2002). However, this economic growth was not enjoyed by everyone, as many 
developing countries, particularly those considered to be least-developed countries (LDCs), saw 
very little overall gains and only incremental growth in market access (Kumar 2002; Ostry 2002; 







  Table 1: Comparison of World Merchandise Exports by Region, 1990 and 2000 
 
Value  Share  Annual percentage change 
Year 2000  1990 2000  1990-00 1998 1999 2000 
World 6186  100.0 100.0  6 -1 4 12 
North America 1058  15.4 17.1  7 -1 5 12 
  United States 781  11.6 12.6  7 -1 3 11 
Latin America 359  4.3 5.8  9 -1 7 20 
  Mexico 166  1.2 2.7  15 6 16 22 
Western Europe 2441  48.3 39.5  4 4 0 3 
  European Union (15) 2251  44.5 36.4  4 4 0 2 
C./E. Europe/Baltic States 271  3.1 4.4  7 -4 0 26 
  Central and Eastern Europe 116  1.4 1.9  8 9 1 14 
  Russian Fed. 105  - 1.7  - -15 1 39 
Africa 145  3.1 2.3  3 -16 10 27 
  South Africa 30  0.7 0.5  3 -9 1 12 
Middle East 263  4.0 4.2  7 -21 28 46 
Asia 1649  21.8 26.7  8 -6 7 18 
  Japan 479  8.5 7.7  5 -8 8 14 
  China 249  1.8 4.0  15 0 6 28 
  Six East Asian traders 649  7.9 10.5  9 -7 8 19 
 
         









The aftermath of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO, although 
profound steps towards the continued goal of economic liberalization and integration, were not 
without considerable drawbacks for a number of poorer developing countries, who in many cases 
saw only marginal economic growth and an overall reduction of their economic shares. While 
regions like Asia and Latin America saw the largest growth in exports between 1990 and 2000, 
other regions such as Africa saw reduced growth in exports (Table 1). This was especially true 
for the 33 non-oil producing LDCs who relied heavily on agricultural exports and who 
previously depended on trade preferences and import quotas from developed nations.    
 
Aftermath of Uruguay and the debacle of the Seattle Conference 
The lack of economic gains and reduced market shares between 1994 and 1998 had 
heavily affected a number of developing countries. Part of the reason for this deficiency in gains 
stemmed from the concessions that developing countries agreed to make during the Uruguay 
Round discussions. The ‘grand bargain’ struck between developed and developing countries 
ultimately proved more one sided than most originally expected (Amorim 2000; Finger and 
Nogues 2001; Ostry 2002). Developing countries were burdened with costly domestic policy 
implementations over trade matters particularly customs valuations, intellectual property rights, 
and sanitary/phytosanitary measures (Henson and Loader 2001). These new additions, which 
were formerly inapplicable to most developing countries, were now important requirements in 
accordance to the Uruguay package. Developed countries, on the other hand, were still allowed 
to maintain trade barriers over the next several years (Finger and Nogues 2001; Kleen 2008; 




retroactively assume all new and previous agreements regardless of whether or not they had 
previously participated or agreed with them, leading to an increase in both obligations and 
implementation costs of these binding agreements (Kleen 2008). These systemic changes in the 
WTO led to a greater erosion of domestic policymaking and forced national governments to 
undertake new policies that proved unhealthy to their developing economies, but were forced to 
do so in fear of economic sanctions (Khor 2000). Moreover, the changes to the bureaucracy 
made it more difficult for a single country to block or halt new decisions (Finger and Nogues 
2001).    
Implementation costs coupled with continued practices of protectionism from developed 
countries brought about a serious imbalance on the returns of trade liberalization between 
developed and developing countries, and did little to readjust the distribution of wealth (Amorim 
2000). Among much denigration to the outcome of Uruguay, the TRIPS agreement was heavily 
criticized for not only delaying the process of technology transfers, but was also seen as 
unbefitting of the principles of free trade and multilateral agreements (Kleen 2008). Furthermore, 
despite introducing agriculture onto the multilateral agenda, very little substantial liberalization 
took place on the agricultural front, and the introduction of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
in many cases replaced tariffs and quotas as difficult barriers that limited market access (Henson 
and Loader 2001; Kleen 2008). Countries that suffered the most however were lower income 
countries in less developed regions. As seen in Figure 3, Sub-Saharan African countries and non-






Figure 3: Growth of Merchandise Exports, 1970- 2001 (Excluding Oil Exports) 
 
Source:  (Market access for developing countries exports  2001) 
 
The Uruguay Round and its impact on the economic landscape during the 1990s brought 
a serious imbalance of profitable returns between the Global North and Global South, where 
ultimately the more advanced developed economies reaped the greatest benefits. Critics of the 
Round declared that Uruguay asymmetrically favored developed nations in spite of increased 
participation from the developing world (Cho 2009b; Finger and Nogues 2001; Ostry 2002). 
Developing nations continued to suffer economically from the prolonged use of protectionist 
measures concerning sensitive areas of trade like agriculture and textiles, aspects of trade that 
most developing countries would otherwise have a comparative advantage, and therefore did not 
see the benefits of improved market access or any technical or financial assistance (McGuirk 
2002) As a result of these conditions, many became disillusioned by the promises of improved 
economic development through free trade liberalization and WTO participation (Cho 2009a; 
Summers 2001). These dissolutions were felt at the organization’s 1st Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore, as pressing issues were put forward regarding trade facilitation, transparency and 




economies, as well as the dangers of continued marginalization under the current trade schema. It 
also stressed the need for the quick implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
for the benefit of poorer countries (Cho 2004). The 2nd Ministerial Conference took place at 
Geneva in 1998, and achieved little in the way of follow up regarding developing countries and 
their needs, partly due to the aftermath of a financial crisis that still heavily affected East Asian 
member countries. The conference was largely ceremonial, marking the 50th anniversary of the 
birth of the modern world trade system under the GATT agreement. WTO officials reaffirmed 
the need for multilateral agreements, warning against the use of protectionist policies, and agreed 
upon a work program regarding electronic commerce and tariff exemptions, but once again, 
developmental concerns were largely sidelined (Cho 2004).   
The growing disillusionment of free trade globalization and WTO effectiveness among 
developing member countries reached a fever pitch at the 3rd Ministerial Conference in Seattle, 
Washington, where 135 representatives convened between November 30th and December 3rd in 
order to examine current trade agreements as well as discuss the possibility of formulating an 
agenda for a new round of negotiations at the onset of the millennium (Seattle Briefing Notes  
1999). This conference was also expected to serve as a forum to discuss potential solutions over 
a number of issues, including implementation strategies of past agreements, environmental 
protection, labor laws and providing aid for severely hampered developing countries, in 
particular LDCs (Amorim 2000; Summers 2001). However, the meeting was plagued from the 
start by both hostile protesters and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) who sought to 
disrupt the proceedings at every turn, as well as serious internal wrangling over the scope and 
objectives of a new Negotiation Round (Seattle Briefing Notes  1999). An address made by then 




standards further fanned the fire, and put many developing countries on the defensive over the 
issue (Cho 2004). After four days of continued debate, a consensus could not be reached, and 
thus the Seattle Conference was terminated without any meaningful conclusions (Seattle Briefing 
Notes  1999; Summers 2001). The debacle of the Seattle Conference not only failed to procure a 
new trade agenda for the new millennium, but also cast serious doubts onto the future 
progression of global free trade and the validity of the WTO as a proper mediator.  
 
GATT and the Uruguay Round in Retrospect 
In hindsight, the transition from the GATT to the WTO was a lengthy and complicated 
process that took decades to fulfill, and has since become an incredibly polarizing topic. Often 
falling victim to the changing dynamics of international trade as well as public opinion, the 
provisional GATT system took a very simplistic and traditional approach in promoting 
multilateral trade, concentrating mainly on the removal of tariffs for industrial goods. While it 
did succeed in its intended goal, it also proved extremely difficult to adjust to the changing 
climate of global trade during the 1970s and 1980s. The creation of the WTO as a replacement 
organization was seen as a small miracle and had been lauded by supporters as an assertion of 
free trade as a developmental solution. However, others saw it as ineffective attempt to 
modernize an already outmoded system that was intrinsically biased and in favor the world’s 
most influential economies (Steger 2009). Many have since pointed out the polarization that had 
taken place among WTO members, particularly among developed and developing countries, with 
both continuously trying to pursue their own agendas, often to the detriment of multilateral 




(Solanki 2012). The ascension of the WTO, while initially hailed as a triumph of free trade ideals 
and a milestone achievement for continued cooperation and global economic prosperity for all 
participating nations, has since been seen as an inherently biased system formed by developed 
economies for the benefits of developed economies, which inherently lacks the flexibility or the 
internal mechanisms to properly accommodate a newer and more diverse economic landscape. 
The effects that the WTO’s transformation yielded proved far from desirable for a number of 
countries who did not receive the benefits of liberalizing their economies, and the growing 
discontent among developing economies have been well documented. The failure at Seattle 
compounded these growing resentments for both the WTO and the principles of free trade it has 
tried to instill (Steger 2009). It was for these reasons among many others that the Doha Round 
was launched. The following chapter will focus on the WTO latest negotiating Round and assess 













A New Trade Round: Doha 
The Doha Round 
The Doha Development Agenda, more popularly known as the Doha Round, is 
considered by many scholars and economists to be a highly divisive and controversial subject, 
with volumes of literary works being devoted to its incredible complexity and spotted track 
record. Officially commencing at the WTO’s 5th Ministerial Conference on 2001 in Doha, Qatar 
and continuing to this day, it has become the longest running trade round in global trade history, 
now in its 14th year with no definitive end in sight. But what exactly is the Doha Round, what are 
its main objectives, who are the central players most directly involved in its negotiations, and 
what are the potential repercussions should this round continue to stagnate or fail altogether? 
Answering these questions not only requires a close examination of the Doha Round itself, but 
also entails an understanding of the prime actors and the socio-economic climate that surrounded 
it, as well as an understanding of prevailing opinions of the WTO and global trade.  
From the beginning, Doha’s launch was burdened by both technical and political 
obstacles, as well as a sheer lack of political will among several major economic players. The 
European Union was among one of the more reticent of WTO members who were largely 
uncertain of a new round of negotiations, and opposed the very core of its built-in agenda. The 
United States, for its part, took a drastically different position in comparison to the beginnings of 
the Uruguay Round, and was far less inclined to initiate another round of negotiations after 
securing largely favorable terms in the last one (Kleen 2008). Another complication that arose 




growth of the internet and growing public awareness of WTO rulings and their social 
consequences (Kleen 2008). Also, despite their grievances regarding the WTO system and a 
desire to redress the imbalances brought under the GATT system, developing countries were 
themselves put in a difficult position to engage in another round after struggling to absorb the 
costly concessions made during the Uruguay Round (Cho 2010; Kleen 2008). Given these 
realities, and coupled with the disastrous debacle of the Seattle Conference, prospects for 
launching a new round looked bleak (Kleen 2008).  
It was against this less than auspicious backdrop that Doha officially commenced on 
November 2001. Spurred on by the political realities of the new millennium, mainly the 
slowdown of the world economy and the mounting problems caused by Uruguay’s agenda, WTO 
officials and world leaders agreed to convene another round in Doha, Qatar under less than 
stellar conditions (Cho 2010). The locale was also a very deliberate choice, as the uncertain 
political climate at the time fostered a need to promote international good will following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, particularly among Middle Eastern countries (Cho 2010; Kleen 
2008). Doha’s official mandate was incredibly broad and ambitious, even larger than Uruguay’s, 
and stood out from all other previous rounds to date because it was specifically labeled as a 
Development Round from the very beginning, taking a special interest in not only the 
international but also the internal economic constraints that developing countries face and 
highlighting the importance of trade as a means of development (Cho 2010).  Much of these new 
changes in direction and greater emphases on development was largely the result of a noticeable 
shift in economic power away from the long dominant developed countries, and the emerging 
economic clout of larger developing countries, with China’s ascension to WTO member status 




declaration encompassed a wide range of important trade-related and developmental issues. As 
seen below, a large number of listed goals outlined in the declaration specifically pertained to the 
needs of developing countries, or addressed the issues of implementation that manifested 
following the outcome of the Uruguay Round. 
Table 2: Doha Ministerial Objectives as of 2001 
- The phasing out of agricultural subsidies and other trade-distorting domestic support* 
- Solutions to implementation-related issues faced by member countries* 
- The expansion of non-agricultural market access* 
- The continued discussions of trade in services  
- The review and implementation of the TRIPs agreement 
- Continued discussions regarding the relationship between trade and investment  
- Establishing a multilateral framework for the enhancement of trade and competition * 
- Improving transparency in government procurement 
- The identification and improvement of trade facilitation needs and technical assistance and 
support* 
- Clarification and improvements to WTO disciplines, taking into account the needs of 
developing and least developed countries* 
- Clarification and improvements to the WTI Dispute Settlement Understandings 
- Environmental considerations and reform 
- Establishment of institutional arrangements regarding electronic commerce 
- Examination of the relationship between trade, debt and finance and potential solutions* 
- Improving market access for LDCs* 
- The implementation of special and differential treatment for developing countries and 
LDCs* 
* Notes objectives specifically related to development 
Source:  (Doha Ministerial Declaration  2001) 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm 
 Doha’s labeling as a developmental agenda not only served as a recognition of the 




current multilateral agreements and the need for exemptions and assistance for countries who 
failed to benefit from liberalization or lack the infrastructure or technical expertise to effectively 
compete. It also endeavored to address many of the growing criticisms of increasingly vocal 
NGOs and developing countries regarding certain trade practices. As stipulated in its official 
mandate:  
“We agree to a work programme, under the auspices of the General Council, to 
examine issues relating to the trade of small economies. The objective of this work is 
to frame responses to the trade related issues identified for the fuller integration of 
small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, and not to create 
a sub-category of WTO Members. The General Council shall review the work 
programme and make recommendations for action to the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference.”    
-(Doha Ministerial Declaration  2001)      
Paragraph 35 
 
These new objectives and sweeping declaration instilled a renewed emphasis for multilateral 
discussions and hope for lasting change of the world economy. Countries of the Global South 
expected their plights to be resolved and the trade imbalance caused by Uruguay to be redressed. 
Considering the urgency of the matter and the political climate at the time, an ambitious deadline 
was decided by January 1st, 2005 (Cho 2010). That deadline ultimately proved woefully 
unrealistic. 
 
The Cancun Debacle   
The fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico convened on September 14th 2003 
and was launched to assess the progress of Doha negotiations and develop a workable framework 
that would facilitate Doha’s completion by the initial deadline (Cancun Ministerial Statement  




for the future of the global trade system and the global trading community at large. Yet despite 
ardent attempts and a desire for a quick conclusion, the Conference terminated after a complete 
and irreconcilable collapse in negotiations, delivering a serious blow to the promise of a swift 
and trouble-free negotiation process. Cancun’s concluding statement thereafter urged for WTO 
officials to “continue working on outstanding issues with a renewed sense of urgency and 
purpose and taking fully into account all the views we have expressed in this Conference” 
(Cancun Ministerial Statement  2003). 
What were the reasons for this outright failure? The problems behind this collapse stems 
from a combination of internal complications as well as opposing external political and 
economic forces (Cho 2004). Not unexpectedly, agriculture was at the center of the controversy. 
Despite commitments made at Doha from member countries to remove export subsidies and 
domestic support, very little in the way of reductions had been made this area, and Cancun soon 
became a hotbed of dissenting political motivation with member countries failing to agree on 
basic sets of modalities (Cho 2004). The United States and European Union took a surprising 
joint stand on agriculture, and offered a proposal filled with vagaries that entailed only limited 
removal of export subsidies to products deemed of particular interest to developing countries, as 
well as a category for lesser-trade distorting support which lacked a detailed timetable or specific 
reduction figures. Their stances were heavily influenced by domestic agricultural sectors and 
private industries, with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and then-President Bush’s 2002 
US Farm Bill, domestic policies that directly violated WTO trade rules against subsidies and 
trade-distortions. Heavily opposed to this stance were China, India and Brazil, who over the 




submitting their own proposal for the complete elimination of all export subsidies for all 
products (Cho 2004). The US and EU subsequently rescinded their proposal. 
Agriculture was far from the only roadblock that WTO ministers and representatives 
faced. Other major impediments on the agenda were the so-named Singapore issues, which were 
originally raised at the WTO’s 1st Ministerial Conference, and caused a major rift between 
developed and developing countries over its relevance on the WTO trade agenda as well as 
effective means of implementation. These four principle issues heavily contributed to the debacle 
of the Seattle Conference of 1999. Singapore concerned the relationship between Trade and 
Investment, interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, transparency in Government 
Procurement and trade facilitation, subjects that proved extremely divisive among Global North 
and Global South Countries ((Baldwin 2006; Cho 2004). These issues, technically complex, and 
heavily entrenched in both the social and domestic levels proved an immovable obstacle that 
could not be adequately resolved (Baldwin 2006; Cho 2004).   
The debate on textiles was an equally controversial topic, particularly for the four cotton-
producing African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, who issued a desperate 
proposal entreating for richer WTO members to eliminate all subsidization of cotton farming and 
accord their own cotton farmers financial compensation for economic damages (Cho 2004). 
Heavily reliant on cotton, which accounted 80 percent of their total exports, these countries 
specifically attacked US subsidies, which directly hurt their economies, and prevented them from 
competing on an equal footing. This proposal gained support, but was ultimately rejected by the 
US, who insisted on diversification and argued that US subsidies were not entirely to blame for 




collectively led to the failure of Cancun negotiations on September 14th, effectively guaranteeing 
that the original deadline to conclude the Doha agenda would not be reached (GAO 2004). 
The demise of the Cancun Ministerial Conference served as a rude awakening for many 
countries and its failure placed the WTO in a precarious position. What was supposed to be a 
midway assessment of global trade progressions of the Doha Agenda devolved into a political 
medley of oppositional views and finger-pointing over who was to blame, with developed and 
developing countries blaming one other for the conference’s failure. More overtly, however, 
Cancun demonstrated the extreme difficulty of the current climate of trade negotiations and the 
surprising fragility of the world trade system (Baldwin 2006; Cho 2004). The WTO was heavily 
criticized for its lack of preparation and many of its member countries were also blamed for 
constant missed deadlines. The fallout from Cancun not only brought into question the future of 
the global trade community, but also exasperated an increasingly growing trend of power 
struggles, fractionalization and regional as well as ideological demarcations.  
 
Hong Kong 
 The failure of Cancun placed WTO officials on damage control, and an attempt to 
remedy the situation was made in Geneva in July 2004, where WTO members finally succeeded 
in agreeing on a framework for the remainder of the Doha Round in preparation to the next 
Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (Cho 2010; Green 2005). The ‘July Package’ included 
frameworks for agriculture and cotton and also acknowledged the sensitivity of these trade 
matters on the global agenda, in particularly to developing countries and LDCs (Doha Work 




implementation strategies and the usual suspects of sensitive trade issues. The US and EU 
attempted to reinitiate the momentum by submitted agricultural proposals, focusing on domestic 
support, market access and export competition, but their proposals proved quite hollow upon 
further inspection, entailing little to no cuts to export subsidization. It also stipulated a number of 
loopholes to allow the continued dumping of agricultural goods. In spite of the shallow 
agricultural agreement, the EU still demanded increased market access from developing 
countries in exchange for what concessions were made (Green 2005). Other major areas of trade 
proved equally problematic; disputes over nonagricultural tariffs and the proper formulas for 
tariff cuts bogged down subsequent proceedings. The service sector fared little better, as 
developed countries, particularly the EU, felt underwhelmed by the offers presented by 
developing countries, and as a result pushed for a new system of minimum benchmark 
commitments which was contrary to all other existing WTO agreements. A draft text of the 
proposal was produced in October of 2005 in spite of complaints from developing countries 
(Green 2005). However, an agreement on trade modalities consequently failed to be reached 
(Fergusson 2008).  
 The start of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December of 2005 became a 
political battleground over recurring issues of agriculture and cotton, with a number of different 
WTO members coalescing into various alliances for the benefit of political bargaining power and 
mutual benefits. Although coalitions of likeminded countries had existed throughout previous 
negotiations, the Hong Kong Ministerial saw a massive consolidation of various block groups in 
opposition to the Global North. The largest, the G 110 block group, consisted of a huge majority 
of developing countries from the African, Caribbean, Pacific Group of States (ACPs), LDCs, the 




emerging as two of the primary leaders. Power-plays between the US, EU and G110 muddled 
negotiations with the US and EU attempting to divide developing countries over specific trade 
issues and bi-lateral offers of significant Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) concessions 
(Green 2005). This political wrangling amounted to very little, ultimately devolving to threats 
and assignments of blame for another potentially failed conference (Cho 2010; Fergusson 2008). 
 For a time, the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference appeared as if it was going to be a 
success, and even managed to make some significant gains in a number of trade areas, including 
agriculture. A definitive deadline was agreed upon for the phasing out of all export subsidies by 
2013, as well as provisions for Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM). SSM rules allowed 
developing countries a certain modicum of freedom to set aside products that are most vital to 
their domestic industries and rural development through volume and price controls (Green 2005). 
Developed countries also agreed to more rigid and explicit rules regarding domestic support, 
which theoretically should have restricted developed countries’ continued practices of market 
distortions. These provisions were necessary addendums, but they did little to address the larger 
issues of dumping, and did not heavily cut into issues of subsidy exemptions for richer countries. 
Cotton was another hard fought issue that received some progress for African cotton-producing 
countries. After a very unsubstantial offer from the US, African countries managed to negotiate 
the total elimination of export subsidies as well as promised commitments from the US to further 
reduce trade-distorting practices for cotton (Green 2005). NAMA discussions boiled down to 
disputes over applications of appropriate tariff-reducing formulas, with developed countries 
advocating the Swiss Formula that inequitably cut developing countries’ higher tariff levels than 
developed countries’ lower tariff levels. Developing countries formulated another core group of 




proposition. The Swiss Formula was amended, opening up new prospects for a more 
developmentally friendly alternative, although an agreement on the particular aspects was never 
reached (Green 2005). Perhaps the most critical issue for LDCs and SVEs was the component of 
the negotiations dedicated to establishing modalities for Aid for Trade. To this end, members 
agreed to a WTO task-force dedicated to improving poorer countries trade capacity and provide 
improved opportunities (Green 2005). This stipulation was regarded as long overdue and 
welcomed addition to the Doha Round’s developmental focus. However, despite these gains, 
negotiations once again effectively stalled, with WTO members failing to agree on modalities for 
the larger issues of agriculture and NAMA, pushing Doha’s scheduled deadline to April of 2006 
(Cho 2010). That deadline was once again missed and pushed to June of the same year, but 
irreconcilable differences over the main issues of the agenda proved too great to overcome.  
 
Geneva, Bali and Beyond 
 The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference was seen by many as the last best chance to put 
the Doha Round back on track, but political and commercial differences among key players in 
the negotiations ultimately derailed any hope of a definitive resolution. Future negotiations 
subsequently failed to bear fruit at a high level meeting in Geneva on June 20th 2006, after a 
compromise proposed by the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy dubbed the ‘20-20-20 
proposal’ fell through (Fergusson 2008). World leaders and representatives convened at St. 
Petersburg for a G-8 summit to renew their pledges to reach an agreement on modalities for 
agriculture and industrial market access, but less than a week later, future negotiations were 




attributed to an irreconcilable deadlock among the G-6 group of countries, namely the US, EU, 
Japan, Australia, Brazil and India over agricultural tariffs and subsidies (Fergusson 2008). This 
suspension was the first time in WTO history that a schedule for a new ministerial conference 
would not be announced, and brought about serious doubts to the success of the Doha Round as 
well as uncertainty for the future of the global trade community (Cho 2010).  
 Following the suspension of future ministerial conferences, the US, EU, India and Brazil 
engaged in their own discussions to resolve the deadlock of agriculture and NAMA modalities, 
but resulted in another collapse on the third day of the G4 Ministerial Meeting at Potsdam, 
Germany in June of 2007 (Ismail 2009). Follow-up committee level discussions in July of that 
same year yielded some much needed results, with the chairs of both agriculture and industrial 
market access managing to create a draft text of modalities and supposedly balanced concessions 
between developed and developing countries. After a number of revisions, the draft was 
circulated in July of 2008 in Geneva, but was heavily panned by virtually all parties involved and 
unsurprisingly, negotiations failed (Fergusson 2008).  
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 spurred many world leaders to reconvene higher-
level trade talks, and was largely the main motivation for the reinstitution of the WTO’s 
ministerial conference. The 7th Ministerial Conference in Geneva took place on November 30th 
2009, four years after the termination of the one in Hong Kong, and exactly a decade since the 
disastrous Seattle Conference in 1999. Unlike the other conferences, however, Geneva 2009 
avoided detailed trade discussions over the more contentious issues, focusing instead on the 
review of WTO functions and activities as well as ironing out minor technical issues regarding 
electronic commerce and TRIPs agreements (Scott and Wilkinson 2010).  By comparison to 




decade before, Geneva was a surprisingly small-scale, with considerably fewer participating 
delegates. It also drew considerably less media attention than previous conferences, with less 
than 400 journalists attending compared to more than 4,000 journalists accredited to have 
attended Hong Kong. NGO participation was also considerably reduced, with 435 officially 
represented as opposed to more than a thousand NGOs in Hong Kong (Scott and Wilkinson 
2010). This relative scaling down and apparent lack of mainstream interest in WTO proceedings 
was partly due to the deliberately unambitious nature of the Conference, and partly due to the 
overall public perception that nothing significant would be agreed upon (Scott and Wilkinson 
2010). 
Geneva’s Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the urgency and collective desire to 
conclude the Doha Round by the end of 2010, and to this end, delegates agreed to take on a stock 
talking session, although the details and content of this session were left undecided (Scott and 
Wilkinson 2010). Beyond the declaration however, Geneva 2009 accomplished little to resolve 
the larger problems of Doha. The conference was considered and deliberately designed to be a 
non-event in order to minimize the possibility for another consecutive failure (Grammling 2009). 
Instead delegates focused on the technical aspects of WTO discussions, which led to the 
ratification of three main agreements. The first was an addendum to the TRIPS agreement 
concerning non-violation and situation complaints. The second entailed the memorandum 
regarding tariffs for electronic commerce. The third and most significant was a draft resolution 
on the long enduring EU banana dispute. This third agreement, which entailed the EU cutting its 
tariffs on bananas at the behest of Latin American countries, was actually harmful for ACP 




provide 200 million dollars in aid to ACP countries to diversify their economies in order to cope 
with the economic shortfalls of this agreement (Scott and Wilkinson 2010).    
The unsatisfactory outcome of the Geneva Conference was an unfortunate blow to the 
prospects of a conclusion to Doha. The 2010 deadline once again lapsed, and as before, questions 
as to the level of commitments among member countries towards completing the Doha agenda 
were raised. Geneva 2009, although technically a success, lacked the ambition and the political 
earnestness that former conferences carried, and ultimately failed to even attempt to remedy the 
political rift between developed and developing countries (Grammling 2009; Scott and 
Wilkinson 2010). The situation did not improve at the Doha’s 8th Ministerial Conference two 
years later, when delegates declared another impasse regarding Doha trade discussions, ending 
with trade ministers formally directing WTO members to reassess and explore new approaches 
to the negotiations. Yet just as all faith and remaining political will seemed to be completely 
exhausted, a small breakthrough was made at the WTO’s 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali. 
The Bali Ministerial Conference, which took place on December 2013, represented a 
historic milestone in the history of the WTO, as it was the first time since the organization’s 
formal establishment that a multilateral agreement was successfully ratified (Karmakar 2013). In 
the months leading up to the conference, representatives attempted to identify a small package of 
proposals that were more realistically and more likely to be agreed upon, which entailed broad-
stroke proposals for three of the larger sticking points of the Doha negotiations: agriculture, trade 
facilitation and special and differential treatment/LDCs issues (Briefs 2014; Karmakar 2013). 
Agriculture in particular was a daunting task to overcome, as the EU and India disputed over 
issues of food securities, in particular the appropriate use of public stockholding for food 




reached a compromise, with India accepting a deal for greater leniency regarding food securities 
in which no WTO member would challenge a developing country that exceeded the permissible 
limit of agricultural domestic support (Briefs 2014). Trade facilitation essentially concerned the 
reduction of border barriers and involved the improvement of customs procedures. 
Developmental issues regarding LDCs included the adoption of an improved Monitoring 
Mechanism to allow the WTO to analyze and review the implementation of Special and 
Differential Treatment (S&DT), which allowed for duty free, quota free market access, and 
waivers for LDCs on services (Karmakar 2013).    
The Bali Ministerial Conference provided a much needed breakthrough for the WTO and 
revived the organization’s credibility as a relevant institution for global trade in an increasingly 
complicated and regionalized geo-economic landscape. However, as in the past, the Bali package 
was seen as more of a victory for industrialized countries like the US and EU, as well as larger 
industrialized developing countries, because of the agreement on trade facilitation, notably the 
liberalization of customs procedures. Meanwhile, LDCs and smaller developing countries largely 
received interim solutions regarding food securities, and promises for continued efforts to reach 
permanent solutions. This salvaged version of the original Doha mandate, though perhaps more 
attainable than its predecessor given past differences and a precarious economic climate, has also 
potentially diluted the original goals of the agenda and its developmental focus (Devarakonda 
2013). WTO officials have assured the agreements reached in Bali would not be the end of Doha, 
but rather the beginning of a long trek to the completion of the Round, and have announced their 
intentions to capitalize on recent gains in negotiations at the upcoming 10th Ministerial 
Conference in Nairobi, Kenya.  Yet whether or not this small measure of success in Bali will 






An Uncertain Future? 
 
What Went Wrong With Doha? 
 The Doha Round has been characterized by a string of failures, compromises and missed 
opportunities since its early beginnings. Its ailments are heavily rooted in the history of 
multilateral trade, harkening back to the legacy of the GATT, the Uruguay Round and the long 
existing trade imbalances that manifested between the Global North and Global South. Despite 
the round’s official labeling as a developmental round, the developmental aspects of the agenda 
have in many cases been sidelined on account of the disputes between the larger developed and 
developing countries over agricultural subsidies and market access negotiations. The Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 also took a heavy toll on WTO members, with trade volume actually 
shrinking by 9%, the largest contraction since World War II, making it a difficult environment 
for continued trade discussions and concessions (Karmakar 2013). The latest Bali Conference in 
2013 offered some much needed optimism to the international trading community, as well as 
enabled a long overdue agreement on trade facilitation,  but questions as to whether or not Doha 
can be salvaged remain unanswered. Within the last several years, criticisms have been issued 
that the WTO as an institution has grown out of date and out of touch with a rapidly changing 
and increasingly regionalized trade landscape (Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong 2010; Koopmann 
and Wittig 2014). Why has the Doha Developmental Agenda taken so long to complete, and why 
has a compromise between developed and developing countries proved so problematic to reach? 
Perhaps more interestingly, what are the potential ramifications if Doha continues to remain 




questions lie at the very core of Doha’s developmental roots, as well as the changing dynamics 
of an incredibly complex and ever changing free trade system. Current scholarly works have 
identified three main factors that have directly contributed to this deadlock:  
1) Differing opinions and anticipations for the Doha Round have greatly undermined the 
negotiation process and directly led to the demise of the Cancun and Geneva 
Conferences  
2) The ascension of larger developing economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and Korea (BRICK) have offset the traditional balance of power between the Global 
North and Global South 
3) The global trade landscape has shifted away from WTO multilateral trade agreements 
towards regional and bilateral agreements between countries 
These three factors are closely interrelated and exemplified throughout GATT’s/WTO’s history 
(Cho 2010; Kleen 2008; Steger 2009).  
 Doha’s unique developmental focus is what separates itself from every other trade round 
in GATT/WTO history, but it has also been a primary issue of contention among WTO members 
and one of the principle causes for the Round’s deadlock. Sungjoon Cho’s analysis of Doha 
attributes the failure in part to the Round’s incapability to juggle the developmental goals of 
developing countries while simultaneously accommodating to the interests of developed 
countries (Cho 2009b, 2010). This conflict stems from the philosophically contrasting 
viewpoints of the Global North and Global South over their expectations of the Doha Round, 
particularly over their opinions on agricultural sectors. Developed countries such as the US, EU 




their own commercial interests and gain increased market access from larger developing 
countries. This was evident at the Cancun and Hong Kong Ministerial Conferences, when both 
the US and EU used their enormous agricultural protections as bargaining chips in exchange for 
improved market access (Cho 2010). Developing countries, for their part, wanted developed 
countries to remove any agricultural protections without offering significant compensation. 
India, China and Brazil in particular were key negotiating players and among the largest 
opponents to the US and EU, particularly over issues like SSM and cotton subsidization (Wolfe 
2015). These differences exasperated already sensitive trade talks and directly led to the debacles 
at both the Cancun and Geneva Ministerial Conferences in 2005 and 2008.   
 Although irreconcilable philosophical differences over key aspects of trade were the most 
obvious reasons for Doha’s continued stagnation, trade discussions were also equally affected by 
larger systemic shifts in the global economy (Kleen 2008). As a point of comparison, GATT’s 
Uruguay Round was another equally controversial and highly complex negotiation round that 
attempted to reconcile a number of shortfalls that developing countries had with the global trade 
system. In many ways, Doha was launched as a direct reaction to the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round, and meant to address the trade imbalances that manifested as a result of its lopsided 
agreements. Why had the Uruguay Round successfully concluded while Doha so far has not? 
According to Peter Kleen, part of the reason for this was that developing countries as a whole, 
were both ill equipped and unfamiliar with GATT negotiations, and subsequently lacked the 
means to pursue their own interests. Also, developing countries predominantly lacked strong 
economic clout during the latter part of the GATT era (Kleen 2008). After the New Millennium 
however, this shift in economic power drastically changed, largely due to the incorporation and 




opponents against the US and EU concerning WTO negotiations. As seen in Figure 4, the total 
merchandise export value for developing countries sextupled between 1995 and 2012, and total 
export shares increased from a little more than a quarter of the total merchandise export value to 
nearly half. This massive growth of developing countries led to a paradigm shift within the 
structure of the WTO, and allotted developing countries much more political clout within Doha’s 
negotiations than in previous ones. This, while helpful from a democratic standpoint within the 
system of the WTO, has also led to a practical deadlock for negotiations, with neither side 
wanting to budge on key issues.  
Figure 4: Developed and Developing Country Merchandise Exports Comparisons, 1995 -2012  
(US$ Billion) 
 
Source: (World Trade Report  2014) 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr14-2b_e.pdf 
 
The third and perhaps one of the most daunting challenges to the Doha Round and the 
WTO as a whole is the growth of bi-lateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) during the 21st 
century. RTAs fundamentally contradict the overall designs of the current multilateral trade 




grown in number since the mid-1990s. By the year 2006, there were 214 regional trade 
agreements that were in force, and by 2015, that number nearly doubled to 406 RTAs (WTO 
Trade Profiles  2015; Fiorentino, Verdeja, and Toqueboeuf 2007). This growing trend is as much 
a symptom of the WTO’s failings as it is another obstacle, as countries, frustrated by the lack of 
progress from the Doha Round’s single undertaking, are now utilizing regional trade agreements 
to suit their economic and developmental needs.  RTAs are also growing far more complex, and 
are going beyond the trade scope of the WTO to incorporate other dimensions including labor 
and environmental concerns. This has been particularly true for developing countries, who are 
now signing agreements amongst themselves. Debra Steger explains that the credibility of the 
WTO hinges largely on the completion of the Doha Round (Steger 2009). A failure to conclude 
it may result in a loss of faith in the WTO’s multilateral system, a more segmented economic 
landscape and a loss in international transparency (Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong 2010; Steger 
2009). 
The long and increasingly complex history of the Doha Round has been marked by 
repeated setbacks and continued deadlocks, resulting in a more fractionalized global trade 
environment. While some hope for the Round’s conclusion remains after the Bali Ministerial 
Conference in 2013, much of the larger problem topics like agriculture and NAMA have 
remained unresolved, and require continued efforts and compromises from both developed and 
developing countries if Doha is to finally succeed. While larger developed and developing 
countries have come to dominate increasingly complex trade negotiations, it is also important to 
recognize the economic players that potentially have the most to lose, and it is critical not to lose 




experiences and future prospects of smaller developing countries and marginalized economies of 
the WTO that are at the greatest risk of economic disenfranchisement. 
 
Developing Nations and Global Trade:  
Developing countries represent a large majority of WTO membership, and ostensibly are 
at the heart of the current trade negotiations. This standpoint served in many ways as an 
acknowledgement from the WTO of the failure of the preceding Uruguay Round and the 
imbalanced outcomes it fostered (Khor and Ocampo 2010). As an attempt to address this 
imbalance, Doha’s declaration clearly emphasizes the importance of global trade to sustainable 
development:  
International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and 
the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the 
increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The 
majority of WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests 
at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the 
Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. 
    -(Doha Ministerial Declaration  2001) Paragraph 2 
The WTO’s multilateral free trade system is essentially built upon two central pillars. The 
first is the promotion of non-discriminatory Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade practices among 
all members, meaning that all countries with MNF status will be accorded equal treatment, and 
given the same trade advantages like low tariffs. The second is the exception to that general rule, 
concerning the Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) clause, which is especially pertinent 
to low income countries and Doha’s developmental mandate. S&DT states that developing 




the mandates of the WTO so long as doing so can impede with social and economic development 
(Bagwell and Staiger 2014). However, the growing complexities of global trade have raised new 
challenges for the multilateral system. 
As mentioned earlier, economic growth of the developing world had offset the traditional 
balance of economic power, leading to a more level playing field, but at the same time, putting 
negotiations in a more precarious state in which compromises are less likely to be made (Cho 
2010). However, this growth has not been shared by all developing countries equally, and the 
overall experiences of the developing world within the WTO’s multilateral trade system have 
been less than stellar. Despite the declaration for economic improvements and development, the 
Round has been beset by a number of unfortunate setbacks, which was largely on account of 
WTO’s single undertaking (Khor and Ocampo 2010). This dimension to free trade proved more 
of a burden than a benefit, as all issues on the agenda had to be agreed upon in order to move 
forward, holding up issues like Aid for Trade and other S&DT provisions. The growth of 
regionalized trade has also led to uneven results amongst and within varying geographical 
locations, with areas like East Asia and Latin America exhibiting much greater economic 
activity, while others like South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa exhibiting considerably less 
activity and commercial opportunities (Khor and Ocampo 2010). These alternatives can prove 
highly profitable to countries of the Global South, particularly following the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis. While this large recession had all but stunted economic growth for developed 
countries, and severely reduced demand, regions of the Global South actually experienced 
economic growth (UN General Assembly Report  2014). It also undermines the MFN principle 




Overall, the complicated nature of today’s global trade environment has had a mixed and 
uneven impact on the economic outlook of the developing world, with some developing 
countries, particularly members of the G33 having the lion’s share of both political and 
economic clout, while smaller economies have and continue to be in danger of marginalization. 
Ironically, it is these small and least developed economies that could potentially have the most to 
gain from a favorable Doha conclusion and in many ways have the most to lose.    
 However, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are considered the most vulnerable 
constituents of the WTO, and are extremely susceptible to outside economic pressures. These 
circumstances leave these countries at a fundament disadvantage in the global market, most often 
because of their lack of proper infrastructure, relative geographical obscurity and heavily 
reliance on natural resource exports that often fluctuate on the international markets. According 
to the United Nations, Least Developed Countries represent the world’s poorest and weakest 
members of the global community, comprising roughly 12% of the world’s population but less 
than 2% of the world’s GDP and accounting for only 1% of global trade in goods (UN OHRILLS  
2015). Currently, 48 countries are listed as LDCs, 34 of which are WTO members, a majority of 
which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, and eight are negotiating for ascendancy. LDCs are 
allowed special privileges in the form of duty free and quota free market access from other 
countries in accordance with the S&DT clause of the WTO, and their economic development is 
closely monitored by the UN (Escaith and Tamenu 2013). These countries lack the means to 
translate trade into meaningful developmental growth, and thus require technical and financial 
assistance (Newfarmer 2006; Nielson 2006). As seen in Figure 5, LDC trade shares constitute a 
minimal fraction of international trade and have fluctuated considerably over the last four 




Figure 5: Trade Shares of LDCs: 
 Exports of Goods and Services 1980-2010  
 
 
Source: (WTO Trade Profiles  2015) 
Information composed from IMF, World Bank and International Trade Statistics 
 
LDCs are constantly under threat of marginalization on the international market, and 
have in many instances been heavily burdened and frustrated by the politics of Doha. This was 
especially true of developed countries’ postponement tactics regarding an agreement on S&DT, 
which highly alienated African member countries (Scott and Wilkinson 2011). Another large 
roadblock occurred at the Cancun Ministerial Conference when the United States refused to give 
concessions on its cotton subsidies, which greatly impacted African LDCs (Cho 2009a). Things 
hardly improved in the subsequent meetings, and a large blow to development came in the 2009 
Ministerial Conference where implementation issues were dropped altogether from the 





Summary and Conclusion 
The Future of Trade and Development 
Global trade is an unceasingly changing and increasingly complicated process of social 
and economic interactions that continues to provide important opportunities as well as new 
challenges for the countries that participate in it. The WTO and its precursor the GATT have 
made tremendous impacts on the evolution of global trade through their promotion of 
multilateralism, but the new geopolitical and economic realities of the 21st Century are adding 
new pressures both to its member countries as well as to the institution itself. Bilateral and 
regional trade agreements have become much more prevalent in recent years, and while they 
could potentially serve as an important alternative to multilateralism, the repercussions to the 
credibility of the WTO may prove more damaging long term, as countries may increasingly 
decide to no longer abide by the WTO’s rulings or its dispute settlement system should the Doha 
Round continue to drag on without meaningful gains. 
Ultimately, the question that has been raised is whether or not the Doha Round can be 
concluded. The answer to that question is that Doha can be concluded, however, when and what 
sort of impact a successful conclusion will bring to development and smaller developing 
countries is very much uncertain. Historically, poorer developing countries have fared worse 
than their developed counterparts, and despite attempts from the WTO to redress this imbalance, 
poorer developing countries have continued to face grave challenges to their economic 
wellbeing. The current economic landscape is not particularly encouraging for a full resolution 




Global North, with only minimal global economic growth being exhibited within the last five 
years. Trade distorting practices like agricultural subsidies are still being utilized by Global 
North countries, and as of now, no signs of a successful compromise between developed and 
developing countries are currently in sight. More damaging however, is the possibility that 
developmental goals will gradually be downplayed, diluted, or altogether delinked from its 
agenda, which could prove detrimental to less economically powerful developing countries. 
In hindsight, the growth and regulation of global trade has been a highly polarizing 
narrative that is deeply rooted in international as well as domestic policymaking, socio-economic 
change and the ever increasingly complicated dimensions of globalization. Due in large part to 
its roots in capitalist economic philosophies, and its establishment by the world economic powers 
of the mid-20th Century, the GATT and its successor the WTO have been inherently designed to 
cater to larger economies, and its multilateral system, while effective in promoting integration, 
have proved to be inherently biased in favor of larger countries. With the advent of the Doha 
Development Agenda, the WTO has made efforts to rectify this imbalance, but has fallen far 
short of its aspired goals, and now stands at a crossroads regarding its future identity as a 
mediator and a promoter of trade and economic development, particularly when taking into 
account the rapidly changing economic landscape of the 21st Century.   
As of now, Doha’s future remains bleak. The current atmosphere of global trade can be 
described as one of uncertainty and fragmentation, an unfortunate and somewhat ironic outcome 
of the continued globalization of trade that was meant to promote interdependency and global 
cooperation. The evolution and expansion of trade and its increasing complexities have taken 
their toll on the WTO and their negotiation process, bringing into question the viability of the 




cannot adapt to the growing complexities of globalized trade and economic integration. As of 
yet, the WTO has failed to meet its intended goals, despite tremendous efforts throughout its 
negotiations. The most glaring failures at Cancun and Geneva, where irreconcilable differences 
and opposing government polices between member countries led to complete collapses in 
negotiations, left black marks on Doha negotiations as a whole. Yet, as the world economy 
continues to recover, the atmosphere may change and become more conducive to pertinent 
global trade talks, and the small breakthrough at Bali may yet be the sign of a long overdue 
resolution that the international trade community needs. Even so, as of now, the WTO and 
country members are fighting what continues to be an uphill battle at the upcoming 10th 
Ministerial Conference at Nairobi Kenya in December 2015, with another missed deadline on the 
remaining issues of the Doha Round missed on July 31st , 2015. Will another breakthrough like 
in Bali be what the international trade community needs to bring Doha back on track towards a 
satisfactory close, or will another missed opportunity lead back to a familiar pattern of continued 
delays and debilitating failures? Only time will tell, but what is absolutely certain is that a firm 
and satisfactory resolution to Doha will require tremendous effort from all participants. The 
principle ideals of the WTO were established to promote cooperation and compromise, but as of 
yet these ideals have not been realized, and ultimately it is the smallest countries who pay the 
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